Voting Rights and the Doctrine of Corporate Entity by Wormser, I. Maurice
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 2 
1916 
Voting Rights and the Doctrine of Corporate Entity 
I. Maurice Wormser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
I. Maurice Wormser, Voting Rights and the Doctrine of Corporate Entity, 2 Fordham L. Rev. 21 (1916). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol2/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Voting Rights and the Doctrine of Corporate Entity.
Corporation A owns all the stock of corporation B. The latter
is run as a subsidiary of the former. The officers of each are
substantially identical. They have separate boards of directors
with varying members and they maintain distinct sets of books.
Their existence as separate organizations is preserved. Corpora-
tion B owns, let us say, one hundred shares of stock in corpora-
tion A. The question is, can it lawfully vote them? Could the
stock held by the subsidiary corporation in the corporation con-
trolling it, be voted upon the issue of the dissolution of the latter,
for example?
The decisions at common law were in conflict as to whether a
corporation had implied power to hold stock in another corpora-
tion. The English cases hold "that there is not, either by the
common or statute law, anything to prohibit one trading cor-
poration from taking or accepting shares in another trading cor-
poration."' The Ohio cases, followed in many American juris-
dictions, hold, on the other hand, "that one corporation cannot
become the owner of any portion of the capital stock of another
corporation, unless authority to become such is clearly conferred
by statute."2 And, says the Ohio Court, "Were this not so, one
corporation, by buying up the majority of the shares of thp stock
of another, could take the entire management of its business,
however foreign such business might be to that which the cor-
poration so purchasing said shares was created to carry on. A
banking corporation could become the operator of a railroad, or
carry on the business of manufacturing, and any other corpora-
tion could engage in banking by obtaining the control of the
1. In re Asiatic Banking Corporation, L. R., 4 Ch. App. Cas., 252;
Canfield & Wormser's Cases on Private Corporations, 215; Booth v.
Robinson, 55 Md.. 419, accord.
2. Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St., 350; Canfield
& Wormser's Cases, 215; Byrne v. Schuyler Mfg. Co., 65 Conn., 336; 31
AU., 833; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill., 268; 22 N. E.,
798; Woodberry v. McClurg, 78 Miss., 831; 29 So. 514; Holmes Mfg.
Co. v. Holmes Metal Co., 127 N. Y., 252; 27 N. E. 831; Easun v.
Buckeye Brewing Co., 51 Fed., 156; Elliott & Wormser's Illustrative
Cases on Private Corporations, 143, accord.
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bank's stock." s It might be urged that such an acquisition, as the
Ohio court mentions, is Olra sares, not because the purchase is
stock, but because the business is outside the scope of the charter
of the purchasing corporation.4 In New York, the difficult ques-
tion, and its corollary-the validity of the holding company-
were put to rest by statutory enactment, which not only gives to
one corporation the right to hold stock in another, but further
contemplates, at least inferentially, the ownership by one corpora-
tion of the entire capital stock of another. 5
We start, therefore, with the hypothesis that there is nothing
in the written law of this state which forbids one corporation
from holding even the entire capital stock of another corporation,
or causes thereby the destruction of their separate corporate ex-
istence. If corporation B is a distinct legal entity from corpora-
3. Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, supra.
4. See Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind., 341; Canfield & Wormser's Cases,
2U5, Note 6. The correct test is, at common law, whether the pur-
chase is reasonably incidental to, and consequential upon, the authorized
corporate objects. This depends on the surrounding circumstances.
5. See. 52. Purchase of Stock of Other Corporations. Any stock
corporation, domestic or foreign, now existing or hereafter organized,
except moneyed corporations, may purchase, acquire, hold and dispose
of the stocks, bonds and other evidences of indebtedness of any cor-
poration, domestic or foreign, and issue in exchange therefor its stock,
bonds or other obligations if authorized so to do by a provision in the
cetUlfcate of incorporation of such stock corporation, or in any certificate
amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, filed in pursuance of law,
or if the corporation whose stock is so purchased, acquired, held or
disposed of. is engaged in a business similar to that of such stock cor-
poration, or engaged In the manufacture, use or sale of the property,
or in the construction or operation of works necessary or useful In the
business of such stock corporation, or in which or in connection with
which the manufactured articles, product or property of such stock
corporation are or may be used, or is a corporation with which such
stock corporation is or may be authorized to consolidate, WThen any
such corporation shall be a stockholder In any other corporation, as
herein provided, its president or other officers shall be eligible to the
office of director of such corporation, the same as If they were indi-
vidually stockholders therein and the corporation holding such stock
shall possess and exercise in respect thereof, all the rights, powers and
privileges of individual owners or holders of such stock. (Stock Corp.
Law, N. Y.)
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tion A, why cannot it hold stock in another corporation, namely,
corporation A, and possess as incident to its ownership of the
stock, the voting rights appurtenant thereto? But, on the other
hand, it may be asked, how can corporation B fairly be per-
mitted to vote its shares in corporation A, since to permit this
would be tantamount to allowing corporation A to vote shares
of itself owned by itself? These questions strike so deeply into
the roots of corporation law that their evasion can hardly be
thought of.
At the outset, let it stand admitted that a corporation cannot
vote its own stock. The cases so hold, and their doctrine is in ac-
cord with the dictates of sound public policy.6 In fact, it is ele-
mentary that "a corporation may not vote shares of its own stock
held by it, either directly or indirectly by a trustee."'7
Conceding this, it is erroneous to affirm that it follows that
-corporation B cannot vote the shares of stock which it owns in
corporation A. That begs the question. It assumes that corpora-
tion B and corporation A are but one entity in the eye of the law,
and that, therefore, corporation A is voting shares of its own
stock. Mere identity of stock ownership does not make two cor-
porations one and the same. This last proposition, however, is
by no means universally conceded. It has become increasingly
the fashion of late, to urge that when the same group of asso-
ciates acting with a common purpose, assumes two separate cor-
porate organizations, the separate entity of the two organizations
is a mere sham, an empty mask, and that the law may and will
strip away the mask and look to the actual persons behind it.,
The contention is-how can a mere process of duplicate cor-
porate christening create distinct juridical personalities, how
6. Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 426; Cook, Corps (7th Ed.),
Sec. 613.
7. See the writer's paper, "The Power of a Corporation to Ac-
quire its Own Stock," 24 Yale Law Journal, 177, 184, collecting the
authorities.
S. This was one of the Government's chief contentions In the re-
cent case of United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co.,
238 U. S., 516; reversing, 213 Fed., 240. The contention was quite
unnecessary.
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can the law treat these corporate Dromios9 as other than one and
the same? However plausible this argument may appear, it can-
not be upheld by the courts without striking at the bed-rock
principle of corporateness, namely, the existence of the corpora-
tion as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members.10
A corporation is much like an expansible symbol, for instance, a
bracket in an algebraic expression; which, while treated as a unit,
is nevertheless capable at any time of being expanded to show
its real constituency. It is logically mandatory that the distinc-
tion between the corporation, as a legal unit, and its members, be
maintained. Would even the most radical contend that the
United States Steel Corporation and the Southern Pacific Rail-
road Company are one and the same, because, by some chance,
their stockholders on a given date are identical? The proposi-
tion that two corporations are identical because their stock own-
ership is the same or substantially the same, is not merely un-
orthodox-it is revolutionary. It ignores the basic conception of
corporation law.
The leading case in this country is Button v. Hoffman. 11  It
was there held that the owner of all the capital stock of a cor-
poration could not bring a replevin suit in his own name to re-
cover certain corporate personalty, since he is not the corpora-
tion, and since "while the corporation exists he is a mere stock-
holder of it and nothing else." And, it is also the rule that the
circumstance that the owner of all the stock is another corpora-
9. Shakespeare's Comedy of Errors, Act. V, Scene 1:
"Duke. One of these men Is Genius to the other; and so of these:
Which is the natural man, and which the spirit? Who deciphers them?
"Dromlo of Syracuse. I sir, am Dromlo; command him away.
"Dromio of Ephesus. I, sir, am Dromio; pray let me stay."
10. People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va., 439; 61 S. E.,
794; 63 S. E., 981; Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 3, holding a corpora-
tion is not a "colored person," though it is admittedly "composed ex-
clusively of negroes." The Civil Law rule is the same. La. Civ. Code,
Arts. 427, 432, 435. 436. And see, Mioton v. Del Corral, 132 La., 730;
61 So., 771.
11. 61 Wis., 20, 20 N. W., 667; Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 7. Cited
with approval as recently as State v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 61
Wash, 507; 11Z Pac., 506.
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tion "makes no difference in principle. ' ' 12 To the same effect are
numerous authorities.13 This doctrine, that the most distinctive
attribute of the corporate type of business organization is its ex-
istence as a legal entity distinct and apart from the stockholders,
is a necessary one. Any other rule "would result in the worst
sort of complication,' 4 particularly where titles to property
might be involved. The New York decisions are in accord, and
adhere to the entity doctrine, 15 unless fraud or its equivalent be
proven distinctly.' 8 In a recent case, 17 Miller, J., said:
"It is well settled that the title to corporate property
is in the corporate entity and not in its stockholders
(Saratac & L. P. R. R. Co. v. Arnold, 167 N. Y., 368;
Butffalo L. T. & S. D. Co. v. Medina Gas Co., 162 N. Y.,
67), and, as the transfer made by Schwickart did not
purport to be a corporate act, it was manifestly insufficient
to transfer the corporate property, although he may
have owned substantially all of the stock."
The English cases take the same point of view. Where all the
shares of a German company were owned by an English company,
12. Exchange Bank of Macon v. Macon Const. Co., 97 Ga., 1; 26
S. E., 826; Canfield & Wormser'e Cases, 10, Note 8.
18. Spencer v. Champion, 9 Conn., 585; Newton Mfg. Co. v. White,
42 Ga., 148; Hopkins v. Roseclare Lead Co., 72 Ill., 378; Allemong
V. Simmons, 124 Ind., 199; Stagg Co. v. Taylor, 113 Ky., 709; In the
Matter of Belton, 47 La. Ann., 1614; England v. Dearborn, 141 Mass.,
590; Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. Co., 98 Me., 579; Rough v. Breitung, 117
Mich., 48; Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn., 48; Central Mfg. Co. v. Mont-
gomery, 144 Mo. App. 494; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Pittsburg Tract.
Co., 196 Pa. St., 25; Rhawn v. Furnace Co., 201 Pa. St., 687; Parker
v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn., 252; Aiello v. Crampton, 201 Fed., 891;
120 C. C. A., 189. But see, Swift v. Smith 66 Md., 428.
14. Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 58 Minn., 214; 54 N. W.,
1115, per Mitchell, J.
15. Stone v. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 202 N. Y., 852; Saranac i.
Co. v. Arnold, 167 N. Y. 868; Buffalo Loan Co. v. Medina Gas Co., 162
N. Y., 67; Irvine v. N. Y. Edison Co., 207 N. Y., 426; Palmer v. Ring,
118 App. Div., 643; New York Air Brake Co. v. International Steam
Pump Co., 64 Misc., 847.
16. Goss & Co. v. Goss, No. 2, 147 App. Div., 698; Garrigues v. In-
ternational Agricult. Corp., 159 App. Div., 877, 880, per Dowling, J.
17. Palmer v. Ring, 118 App. Div., 648; 99 N. Y. Supp., 290; Can-
field & Wormser's Cases, 11, Note 3.
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the court held that this fact "does not make the German company
a mere alias, or a trustee, or an agent for the English company,
or for the stockholders in the English company,"' 8 and declared
that: "The German company is an existing person and a different
entity from the English company." Since the commencement of
the present European conflict, the English courts have made sev-
eral interesting applications of the doctrine of corporate entity.
Of 25,000 shares of stock of a company incorporated in Eng-
land, all the shares except 2 shares were held by alien enemies, to
wit, Germans. The corporation brought suit against a certain
other corporation in an English court. It was held entitled to
sue. 19 The decision is sound. The alien enemy character of the
shareholders did not alter the English domicile and citizenship of
the corporation.20  The decision resembles the well-known early
case of Quten v. Arnaut.2 1  An English statute forbade the
registration of any vessel owned by foreigners, "in whole or in
part, directly or indirectly." A corporation chartered by Eng-
land, whose chief stockholders were foreigners, sought to compel
the registry of its vessel. It was held that the vessel should be
registered. This may strike some persons as anomalous also, but
it is quite correct.22
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that corporation A
and corporation B should be regarded by the courts as two sepa-
18. Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, L. R [19061, 2
K. B., 856 [1908], 2 K. B., 89; Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 39. The
decision is rested on the decision of the House of Lords in Salomon
v. Salomon & Co., I. R. [1897], App. Cas., 22. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts recently rendered a much similar decision.
Brighton Packing Co. v. Butchers' Slaughtering & Melting Ass'n, 211
Mass., 398; Contra, Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St., 236.
19. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., Ltd., v. Diamler Co., Ltd., 138
L. T. J. (C. A.), 272; S, C., 138 L. T. J., 83.
20. Of course, none of the proceeds of the suit, in the event of suc-
cess could be remitted to the enemy shareholders, thus avoiding giving
aid to an alien enemy.
2-1. 9 Q. B. (Adol. & El.), 806.
22. See also, Humphreys v. McKlssock, 140 U. S., 304; In re Water-
town Paper Co., 169 Fed., 262; 94 C. C. A., 528; per Noyes, T. In
McCaskill Co. v. United States, Mr. Justice McKenna recently said:
"Undoubtedly a corporation is in law, a person or entity entirely distinct
from its stockholders and officers." (216 U. S., 504, 514.)
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rate legal persons. They are not the same juridical entity in any
sense of the word. The genera! rule is that the holder of the
legal title to shares of stock is entitled to vote them. When the
laws of the state in which a corporation is organized authorize
the holding of its stock by other corporations, another corpora-
tion holding stock therein and having authority to do so, may vote
the stock to the same extent as any other stockholder.23 This is
fortified in New York by the statutory provision which confers
upon corporate stockholders "all the rights, powers and privi-
leges" of individual stockholders, thus conferring the right to
vote, if not expressly, at least by reasonable implication.24 And,
it has been held in this state that a corporation holding stock in
another corporation possesses all the rights of a natural holder,
including the right to vote.2 5  Hence, corporation B, as the
owner of one hundred shares of corporation A, should be entitled
to vote them. Despite the ownership by corporation A. of all the
stock of corporation B, this is, in no respect, a voting by cor-
poration A of shares of its own stock. 25a
The conclusion is, then, that corporation B may lawfully vote
the one hundred shares of stock which it owns in corporation A.
The corporations are distinct and separate legal entities. The
fact that the shares of corporation B all belong to corporation A
does not make corporation B-to paraphrase the learned English
judge--"a mere alias, or a trustee, or an agent for corporation
A, or for the shareholders in corporation A." Since corpora-
tion B, a distinct juristic person, has lawful title to one hundred
shares of stock in corporation A, and since voting rights follow
legal title, statutory prohibitions apart, it follows that corpora-
tion B is well within its rights in voting the shares which it holds
of corporation A. There is nothing anomalous in this result.
23. Rogers v. Nashville R. Co., 91 Fed., 299; 33 C. C. A., 617; Davis
v. U. S. Elec. Co., 77 Md., 35; Oelberman v. N. Y. R. Co., 76 Hun,
613; 77 Hun, 332; 29 N. Y Supp., 545.
24. N. Y. Stock Corp. Law, Sec. 52. See ante, Note 5.
25. In re Buffalo, etc. R. Co., 37 N. Y. Supp., 1048.
25a. See the decision of Ex-Judge Noyes, as referee, in Lazenby
v. Int. Cotton Mills Corp., et al. But see Vice Chancellor Pitney's de-
cision In O'Connor v. Int. Silver Co., 68 X. J. Eq., 67; affirmed on quite
distinct grounds on appeal (68 N. J. Eq., 680).
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It should be noted that there is no suggestion -in our hypo-
thetical case of fraud or of disregard of the public interests. It
is to ignore the entire theory of separate corporate existence to
declare that one corporation is identical, in the eye of the law,
with another in which it holds a controlling stock interest. But
this doctrine of separate existence may be carried too far, and it is
properly disregarded in cases of fraud, statutory circumvention,
public wrong, and like instance. 2 6 "If any general rule can be
laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a corpora-
tion will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and
until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the no-
tion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons."'27 In a recent English
case, a German vessel owned by a German corporation, while
sailing from Hamburg to London, was sold by telegraph on
August i, to an English corporation, controlled by the German
corporation. On August 4, war was declared between Germany
and England. Next day, the vessel arrived in England and was
seized as a prize. The English corporation claimed that the
transfer to it made the seizure illegal. The Prize Court held the
seizure proper and that the claim was invalid.28  The decision is
sound. The transfer was not valid as it was made in contem-
plation of war and to avoid seizure as a prize.29 Under such cir-
cumstances, the application of the doctrine of distinct corporate
entity, is uncalled for. Lord Mansfield's classic rule as to the use
of fictions of law is applicable:
26. See the writer's paper, "Piercing the Veil of Corporate En-
tity," 12 Columbia Law Review, 496.
27. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed.,
247, 255, per Sanborn, 3.; Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 66, Note 21.
The Appellate Division, First Dept., speaking through Dowling, a.,
said recently: "That the doctrine of corporate entity will not be allowed
to stand in the way of circumventing fraud or administering Justice,
has been held in Goss & Co. v. Goss, No. 2 (147 App. Div., 698)."
Garrigues v. International Agricult. Corporation, 159 App. Div., 877,
880. The Supreme Court of the United States takes the same posi-
tion. LAnn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U. S., 574.
28. The Tommi, 59 Sol. J., 26.
29. See The Ann Green, 1 Gall. (U. S.), 274.
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"It is a certain rule that a fiction of law shall never
be'contradicted, so as to defeat the end for which it was
invented, but for every other purpose it may be contra-
dicted." (Mostyn vs. Fabriges, Cowper, 177 ) .
"Fictions of law hold only in respect of the rules and
purposes for which they were invented; when they are
urged to an intent .and purpose not within the reason and
policy of the fiction the other party may show the truth."
(Morris vs. Pugh, 3 Burr, 1243).
It is often extremely difficult to draw the line. "The answer
perhaps is," to quote the words of Mr. Justice Chitty, "that
courts of justice ought not to be puzzled by such old scholastic
questions as to where a horse's tail begins and where it ceases.
You are obliged to say, 'This is a horse's tail,' at some time."30
In determining when to refuse to apply the doctrine, however, it
is serviceable to bear in mind that "the purpose in making all
corporations is the accomplishment of some public good," 3' 1 and
that no rule of law or logic requires courts to employ the con-
ception of separate corporate existence as a whitewash for cor-
porate wrongdoing. The power of courts to frustrate wrongful
devices is more than coextensive with the perverted ingenuity
which devises them.
It follows that if corporation B were organized, or the stock
transfer made, in our hypothetical case, solely in order to achieve
certain vicious and fraudulent results, the corporate fiction might
be properly disregarded, and the shares of corporation B, accord-
ingly, could not be voted. In the absence of such proof, how-
ever, it seems clear that the shares could legally be voted.
I MAURICE WORMSER.
FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL.
30. Lavery v. Pursell (1888), 39 Ch. Div., 508.
31. Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. (N. Car.). 658.
